


An abstract painting featuring several palm trees. The trunks and fronds are composed of bold, geometric shapes in shades of blue, green, yellow, and black. Two of the palm trees have stylized human faces integrated into their trunks, with large, dark eyes and white, mask-like features. The background is a mix of these colors, creating a layered, cubist effect.

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INSTITUTE FOR CUBAN STUDIES

Cuba Poll 2026

How Cuban Americans in South Florida View U.S. Policies Towards
Cuba, Critical National Issues and the Upcoming Elections

FIU

Steven J. Green
School of International
& Public Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 3

The Researchers.....4

Executive Summary.....5

Contextualizing the Cuban American Population 8

 Key Characteristics of the Cuban American Population in Miami-Dade County 9

 Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County 10

Main Findings.....11

 Political Change in Cuba and Economic Relations 11

 The Carrot, the Stick, and the Crisis on the Island 17

 Maximum Pressure, Negotiation, and Transition 24

 Military Action, Threat, and Terrorism 32

 Ties to the Island 37

 Citizenship, Party, and the Elections.....42

 Iran and the Administration's Handling of Key Issues.....50

 The Importance of Selected Issues to Cuban Americans in South Florida 56

Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology 60

Appendix 2: Selected Trends.....61

Appendix 3: Selected Questions 62

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FOREWORD

Since its return to the White House, the Trump administration has pressed on Cuba with a blockade of oil imports, a rising number of deportations, and a standing call for maximum pressure, while the prospect of negotiation surfaces and recedes with each news cycle. The engagement that President Obama opened in 2014 now reads as a brief interruption in a long history of hostility. What the administration wants from the island, and what it would accept in return, remains unstated. Leadership matters, as it always has, and attitudes in the community adjust to the policy signals sent from Washington. This year the signals are mixed, and the answers reflect it.

Community change and continuity are constants. Individuals arrive, join the community, age, and adjust to life in South Florida, yet community attitudes on many issues remain unsurprisingly consistent. Cuban Americans want change. The wish has outlasted six decades and more than a dozen presidential administrations, and it binds those who left before 1995 to those who arrived after 2020, Republicans to Democrats, and the young to the old. Our respondents hold it with an impatience that shows in how they answered nearly every question about the island's future. Few of them will settle for reform that leaves the current government in place, and many of them expect it within five years, some within the year.

The disagreement concerns what road to follow to achieve change. Cuban Americans in South Florida endorse pressure on the Cuban government and help for the Cuban people in the same interview, often from the same respondent, and they divide evenly over whether the suffering of the Cuban people is an acceptable price for political change. Younger respondents, Cuban Americans born outside Cuba, and Democrats are more ready to talk with Havana. Older migrants and Republicans put their faith in pressure. These are old fault lines, and the poll finds them intact.

The community's politics remain unsurprisingly constant. Registered voters lean Republican by a significant margin, even as they disapprove of how the administration's immigration policies are impacting the community. Independents continue to gain and the youngest members divide among the parties. The elections this November will test how these divisions manifest themselves at the ballot box.

We present you with the results of the 2026 FIU Cuba Poll. As researchers, we owe much to the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs and its Dean, Dr. Shlomi Dinar, whose financial and moral support makes this work possible. We thank Dr. Jeff Gonzalez, Associate Dean, for his unwavering encouragement; Sebastian Arcos, Director of the Institute for Cuban Studies, for his support; and Pedro Botta and Daniel Zayas for shepherding the project to the finish line. Above all, we thank the Cuban Americans who gave us their time on the telephone and told us what they think.

Guillermo J. Grenier, Ph.D.
Qing Lai, Ph.D.
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies

THE RESEARCHERS

Guillermo J. Grenier

Guillermo J. Grenier is professor of sociology in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. Born in Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis and has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation, and Cuban American ideological profiles, particularly in the Greater Miami Area. His books include *A History of Little Havana*, with Corinna J. Moebius (2015); *This Land is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami*, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (2003); *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States*, with Lisandro Pérez (2002); *Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy*, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (1994); and *Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change*, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a Faculty Fellow of the University of Notre Dame's Institute of Latino Research, as well as director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque. His current book project, under contract with University Presses of Florida, is *Living Memory: Creation and Maintenance of Cuban American Political Culture in Miami, 1959–2026*.

Qing Lai

Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology at the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan, where he received training at the Institute for Social Research's Population Studies Center and Survey Research Center. His research interests include social demography and survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed articles in *Social Science Research*, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *Chinese Sociological Review*, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, *Research in the Sociology of Work*, *Natural Hazards*, and *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)*. He joined the FIU Cuba Poll project in 2020 as co-PI. He has also participated in survey research projects on various communities, including the *Xidaotang* Islamic sect in Gansu, Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, *Dungan* Muslims in Central Asia, and the homeless in Miami-Dade County.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year the FIU Cuba Poll asked 1,004 Cuban Americans in South Florida about U.S./Cuba policy, their ties to the island, the administration's performance, and the elections of November 2026. Responses differ most by party affiliation, age, and migration cohort.

Expectations of Change

- Twenty-nine percent say major political change will never occur in Cuba. Twenty-two percent expect it within one year and 40% within five. (Figure 3)
- Sixty-nine percent believe maximum pressure will bring regime change. Republicans (81%) and non-citizens (82%) are the most confident, and Democrats (37%) the least. (Figure 16)
- Eighty percent reject allowing the current government to remain in power in exchange for free market reforms. (Figure 21)

The Stick: Pressure, Blockade, and Military Action

- Seventy-seven percent favor emphasizing maximum pressure on the Cuban government. (Figure 10)
- Sixty-five percent favor the blockade of oil imports. Democrats oppose it (21% in favor), and respondents born outside Cuba split (45%). (Figure 11)
- Seventy-three percent support U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government. Forty-three percent prefer a clandestine operation as the form of action. (Figures 24 and 25)
- Sixty-nine percent approve of keeping Cuba on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and 59% see Cuba as a threat to vital U.S. interests. (Figures 28 and 27)
- Cuban Americans split evenly on whether the suffering of the Cuban people is an acceptable cost of regime change. (Figure 17)

The Carrot: Trade, Aid, and the Private Sector

- Seventy-three percent favor unrestricted sales of medicine to Cuba and 70% favor unrestricted sales of food. (Figures 4 and 5)
- Sixty-nine percent agree the United States should emphasize policies that improve the economic well-being of the Cuban people. (Figure 9)
- Seventy-four percent favor U.S. assistance to Cuba's private sector to relieve the humanitarian crisis, and 70% favor a greater private sector role in supplying household fuel. (Figures 13 and 12)
- Respondents support both approaches: 69% support help for the Cuban people and 77% support maximum pressure on the government. (Figures 9 and 10)

The Embargo, Diplomacy, and Travel

- Sixty-one percent of respondents who expressed an opinion favor continuing the embargo (56% with "Don't Know" counted). Republicans (79%) favor it and Democrats (23%) oppose it. (Figure 7)
- Fifty-eight percent favor maintaining diplomatic relations. (Figure 8)

- Respondents split on unrestricted travel for all Americans: 51% favor and 49% oppose. (Figure 6)

Negotiation and Transition

- Forty-eight percent favor negotiating with influential members of Cuba's leadership, and 48% approve of international mediation. (Figures 18 and 19)
- Sixty-seven percent approve of easing sanctions in exchange for a free market economy within two years. (Figure 20)
- Forty-six percent approve of a transition in which the current government remains in power until multiparty elections, and 51% approve of a multiparty system in which the Communist Party may compete. (Figures 22 and 23)

Immigration

- Seventy-six percent disapprove of increased deportations of Cuban nationals with no criminal record, and 63% disapprove strongly. (Figure 14)
- Eighty-seven percent agree the government should resume processing immigration benefits for Cubans already in the United States. (Figure 15)

Ties to the Island

- Seventy-one percent have close relatives in Cuba, a share that rises from 63% of pre-1995 migrants to 92% of the post-2020 arrivals. (Figure 29)
- Sixty percent sent food or other goods to the island in the past year, and 45% sent money. (Figures 30 and 31)
- Seventy percent are not at all likely to return to live in Cuba if its economy improved, and 63% would still not return if the island changed politically. (Figures 32 and 33)

Citizenship, Party, and the Elections

- Eighty-nine percent of respondents are U.S. citizens, and 96% of citizens report being registered to vote. (Figures 34 and 35)
- Fifty-three percent of registered voters are Republicans, 27% Independents, and 18% Democrats. Respondents under 40 divide among all three parties (40% Republican, 34% Independent, 24% Democrat). (Figure 36)
- Ashley Moody leads Angela Nixon 51% to 26% among respondents who named a choice in the Senate race, and 44% of the full sample are undecided. (Figure 37)
- Byron Donalds leads David Jolly 60% to 24% among respondents who named a choice for Governor, and 39% of the full sample are undecided. (Figure 38)
- Sixty-eight percent would vote for the Republican running in their congressional district. (Figure 39)
- For 2028, Marco Rubio is the choice of 58% for the Republican nomination, while 54% would support no Democrat. (Figures 41 and 40)

The Administration's Performance

- Sixty-six percent support the administration's handling of Cuba policy, 68% its handling of China, 64% of Russia, and 60% of relations with Israel. (Figures 43, 44, 45, and 47)
- Cuban Americans split evenly on the administration's handling of the economy (50% support). (Figure 46)
- Fifty-seven percent approve of U.S. military action against Iran. (Figure 42)

Important National Issues

- The economy (4.78 on a scale from 1 to 5) and health care (4.73) rank as the most important issues, followed by immigration (4.35), Cuba policy (4.18), China (4.01), Russia (3.96), and DEI (3.30). (Figures 48 to 51)
- Cuba policy ranks third among respondents 76 and older and among non-citizens. DEI ranks fourth among Democrats and fifth among the post-2020 arrivals. (Figures 49, 50, and 51)


Where the Community Divides

- Republicans and the pre-1995 migrants give the strongest support to pressure, the blockade, and military action. Democrats give the weakest support to all three. (Figures 10, 11, and 24)
- Respondents under 40 and those born outside Cuba favor negotiating with Cuba's leadership at rates close to Democrats' (57% and 60% against 60%). (Figure 18)
- Consensus appears on humanitarian measures: majorities of every party group favor selling medicine, resuming immigration benefits, and assisting the private sector. (Figures 4, 15, and 13)

CONTEXTUALIZING THE CUBAN AMERICAN POPULATION

Most of the Cuban Americans in the United States live in Florida, and most of the Cuban American in Florida reside in the South Florida region. As a result, Cuban Americans make up a miniscule percentage of the national population but dominate the demographic landscape of Miami-Dade County. Their overwhelming presence in Florida makes their political involvement critically important, particularly during presidential election years.

Figure 1: National Population Estimates: Cubans, Other Hispanics, Non-Hispanics



Key Characteristics of the Cuban American Population in Miami-Dade County

As Table 1 shows, the weighted poll sample tracks the American Community Survey closely on every dimension. Respondents who migrated before 1995 make up 27.9% of the poll sample and 27.9% of the ACS population, the 1995 to 2020 cohort 45.8% against 45.7%, and the 2021 to present cohort 4.7% against 5.0%. U.S.-born Cuban Americans account for 18.9% of the sample and 18.8% of the ACS, and those born in other countries 2.7% in both. Age and gender fall within 0.2 points of the ACS: 30.2% of respondents are 18 to 39 (30.1% in the ACS), 36.0% are 40 to 59, 21.8% are 60 to 75, and 12.0% are 75 to 99, while 51.4% are women (51.2%). Race and education were not weighting variables, and they diverge. White respondents, including those who report White and another race, make up 74.2% of the sample and 90.5% of the ACS population. The poll records 24.2% in other racial categories against 7.5% in the ACS, and 1.6% Black against 2.0%. Respondents average 14.5 years of education (standard deviation 2.8), 1.7 years more than the ACS estimate of 12.8 (3.5). (See Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology)

Table 1. Adult Cuban population in Miami-Dade County

	ACS 2020-2024 (weighted)	Cuba Poll 2026 (weighted)*
Nativity & immigrant cohort		
Born in Cuba		
Migrated before 1995	27.9	27.9
Migrated in 1995-2020	45.7	45.8
Migrated in 2021-present year	5.0	4.7
Born in the United States	18.8	18.9
Born in other countries	2.7	2.7
Age group		
18-39	30.1	30.2
40-59	35.9	36.0
60-75	22.0	21.8
75-99	12.0	12.0
Gender		
Male	48.8	48.6
Female	51.2	51.4
Race		
White & White and another race	90.5	74.2
Black & Black and another race	2.0	1.6
Other	7.5	24.2
Years of education	12.8 (3.5)	14.5 (2.8)

Note: *The 2026 Cuba Poll results are weighted toward the latest ACS 5-year weighted sample based on nativity, immigrant cohort, age, and gender.

Sources: 2026 FIU Cuba Poll; 2024 American Community Survey 5-year sample.

Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County

Table 2 presents our estimate of the current number of registered Cuban Americans by party affiliation in Florida and Miami-Dade County. These numbers become relevant when voting preferences are disclosed. The figures that follow the table highlight the dominance of the Republican Party in Cuban American political life at the state and the county levels.

Table 2. Estimated number of registered Cuban American voters by party, Florida and Miami-Dade County

	Florida			Miami-Dade		
	All*	Hispanic***	Cuban****	All*	Hispanic**	Cuban****
Republican	5,678,755	841,972	369,727	460,976	348,568	237,135
Democrat	4,133,397	716,516	123,104	416,103	181,783	78,956
Other	3,859,970	898,178	197,920	431,357	276,859	126,942
Total registered	13,672,122	2,456,666	690,820	1,308,436	807,210	443,077


Notes: * Official state voter registration statistics as of September 30, 2026, retrieved on October 15, 2026.

** Official MDC voter registration statistics as of October 1, 2026, retrieved on October 15, 2026.

*** Official state voter registration statistics as of July 20, 2026, retrieved on October 15, 2026.

**** Cuban-specific estimates are based on American Community Survey 2020-2024 5-year sample, 2026 Cuba Poll, and official voter registration statistics.

Figure 2: Estimated Voter Registration by Party: Miami-Dade County



MAIN FINDINGS


Political Change in Cuba and Economic Relations

Q2. When will major political changes occur in Cuba?

The largest single group of Cuban Americans believes political change will never come to Cuba.

Twenty-nine percent of respondents say major political change will never occur on the island. Twenty-two percent expect it within one year and 19% within two to five years, so 40% see change arriving inside five years. Another 11% say changes are occurring now. Respondents 76 and older choose "never" more than any other age group (39%). The 18 to 39 cohort pushes the timeline out: 27% choose two to five years and 20% more than ten years. Republicans (27%) are twice as likely as Democrats (13%) to expect change within a year. Thirteen percent of the full sample offered no answer.

Figure 3




Q3. Allowing companies to sell medicine to Cuba in an unrestricted way

Nearly three in four Cuban Americans favor unrestricted sales of medicine to Cuba.

Seventy-three percent favor allowing companies to sell medicine to Cuba without restriction, and 49% favor it strongly. Majorities in every category agree. Support reaches 86% among Democrats, 84% among non-citizens, and 93% among those who arrived after 2020. Republicans support the policy at 62%, while 29% of them strongly oppose it. Among age groups, opposition runs highest in the 40 to 59 cohort (33%).

Figure 4




Q4. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba in an unrestricted way

Seventy percent favor unrestricted food sales to the island.

Support for food sales nearly matches support for medicine. Eighty-one percent of respondents under 40 favor the policy, as do 91% of Democrats and 91% of the most recent arrivals. Republicans (57%) and those who migrated before 1995 (60%) give the weakest support; 31% of the pre-1995 migrants and 34% of Republicans strongly oppose unrestricted food sales.

Figure 5




Q5. Allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba

The community splits down the middle on unrestricted travel.

Fifty-one percent favor allowing all Americans to travel to Cuba without restriction, and 49% oppose it. "Strongly oppose" draws the largest single share of responses (37%). Opposition concentrates among Republicans, 54% of whom strongly oppose the policy, and among those who left Cuba before 1995, half of whom strongly oppose it. Democrats (86%), the post-2020 arrivals (70%), respondents under 40 (62%), and those born outside Cuba (61%) favor open travel.

Figure 6




Q6. Continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba

Six in ten Cuban Americans favor continuing the embargo.

Sixty-one percent of respondents who expressed an opinion favor continuing the sixty-four-year-old embargo; with "Don't Know" counted as a response, the figure is 56%. Forty-seven percent favor it strongly. Republicans lead the support at 79%. Majorities of every migration cohort born in Cuba favor continuation: 63% of pre-1995 migrants, 66% of those who arrived between 1995 and 2020, and 64% of the most recent arrivals. Support drops to 54% in the under-40 group, 52% among Independents, and 45% among those born outside Cuba. Democrats oppose the embargo: 23% favor continuing it and 57% strongly oppose it.

Figure 7




Q7. Maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba

A majority supports maintaining diplomatic relations, though a third strongly oppose them.

Fifty-eight percent of respondents favor maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, and 33% strongly oppose them. Support runs highest among Democrats (87%), those born outside Cuba (77%), the most recent arrivals (73%), and respondents under 40 (64%). Republicans favor diplomatic relations at 44%, and 47% of them strongly oppose. Support also falls to 51% among those who arrived between 1995 and 2020, 42% of whom strongly oppose relations.

Figure 8




The Carrot, the Stick, and the Crisis on the Island

Q8. Emphasizing policies that improve the economic well-being of the Cuban people

Sixty-nine percent agree the United States should emphasize policies that help the Cuban people economically.

Forty-nine percent strongly agree with this approach. Agreement reaches 78% among respondents under 40, 83% among Democrats, 75% among those born outside Cuba, and 96% among the post-2020 arrivals. Republicans agree at 59%, while 35% of them strongly disagree. Respondents over 60 (63%) and those who left Cuba before 1995 (63%) give the approach its weakest support, and a third of the pre-1995 migrants strongly disagree.

Figure 9




Q9. Emphasizing policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government

More than three in four favor maximum pressure on the Cuban government.

Seventy-seven percent agree with emphasizing maximum pressure, and 63% agree strongly. The same respondents who back help for the Cuban people back pressure on its government: 69% support the first approach and 77% the second. Republicans (83%), the 60 to 75 cohort (79%), non-citizens (85%), and the most recent arrivals (92%) give maximum pressure its strongest endorsement. Support is lowest among Democrats, but still a majority (56%).

Figure 10




Q10. The current blockade of oil imports to Cuba

Sixty-five percent favor the blockade of oil imports to the island.

Fifty-three percent strongly favor cutting Cuba off from fuel imports. Support peaks among Republicans (83%), the post-2020 arrivals (78%), those who left before 1995 (73%), and respondents aged 60 to 75 (72%). Fifty-nine percent of those under 40 and 60% of Independents favor the blockade. Respondents born outside Cuba split (45% favor). Democrats oppose it: 21% favor and 58% strongly oppose. The oldest cohort, 76 and over, favors the blockade at 55%, but 36% of them strongly oppose it.

Figure 11




Q11. Allowing Cuba's private sector a greater role in supplying household fuel

Seventy percent favor letting Cuba's private sector supply propane and gas to households.

Half of all respondents (50%) strongly favor a greater role for private suppliers. Democrats (90%), those born outside Cuba (79%), the post-2020 arrivals (76%), and Independents (76%) support it most. Republicans favor the policy at 60%, with a third (33%) strongly opposed. Sixty-five percent of the pre-1995 migrants favor it.

Figure 12




Q12. U.S. assistance to Cuba's private sector to relieve the humanitarian crisis

Three in four favor directing U.S. assistance to Cuba's private sector.

Seventy-four percent favor the United States providing more assistance to Cuba's private sector as a way to relieve the humanitarian crisis, and 56% favor it strongly. Support reaches 92% among Democrats, 82% among those born outside Cuba, and 81% among both respondents under 40 and the post-2020 arrivals. Republicans (64%) and the pre-1995 migrants (63%) favor the policy least; roughly three in ten in each group strongly oppose it.

Figure 13




Q13. Increased deportations of Cuban nationals without legal status and without a criminal record

Three in four Cuban Americans disapprove of the administration's increased deportations of Cubans with no criminal record.

Seventy-six percent disapprove, and 63% disapprove strongly. Only 24% approve. Republicans approve at a higher rate than any other group (37%), yet 63% of Republicans disapprove. Approval reaches 31% among those who left Cuba before 1995 and 30% among respondents 76 and older. It falls to 7% among Democrats, 9% among non-citizens, and 3% among those who arrived after 2020, 92% of whom strongly disapprove.

Figure 14




Q14. Resuming the processing of immigration benefits for Cubans already in the United States

Eighty-seven percent agree the government should resume processing immigration benefits for Cubans.

Sixty-five percent strongly agree. Agreement holds across party lines: 86% of Republicans, 90% of Democrats, and 86% of Independents. The 1995 to 2020 arrivals (94%), the post-2020 arrivals (97%), and non-citizens (96%) agree almost unanimously. Those born outside Cuba agree least (74%), and 26% of them disagree.

Figure 15




Maximum Pressure, Negotiation, and Transition

Q15. Will the "maximum pressure" policy succeed in causing regime change?

Sixty-nine percent believe maximum pressure will bring regime change in Cuba.

Forty-six percent strongly agree that the policy will succeed. Confidence runs highest among Republicans (81%), non-citizens (82%), the post-2020 arrivals (80%), and every Cuba-born migration cohort (70% or more). Sixty-two percent of Independents and 66% of respondents under 40 agree. Those born outside Cuba are less sure (56%). Democrats doubt the policy: 37% agree and 40% strongly disagree.

Figure 16




Q16. Is the increased suffering of the Cuban people an acceptable cost of regime change?

Cuban Americans split evenly on whether the suffering imposed by U.S. policy is an acceptable price.

Fifty percent agree and 50% disagree; "strongly disagree" is the most common single answer (37%). Republicans accept the cost at 70%, and 51% of them agree strongly. Fifty-nine percent of those who left Cuba before 1995 agree. Majorities of Independents (59%), respondents under 40 (60%), and those born outside Cuba (63%) disagree. Democrats reject the proposition: 20% agree and 66% strongly disagree.

Figure 17




Q17. Negotiating with influential members of Cuba's current leadership

Fifty-two percent oppose the administration negotiating with members of Cuba's leadership.

Forty-eight percent favor such negotiations, and 41% strongly oppose them. Democrats (60%), those born outside Cuba (60%), respondents under 40 (57%), and Independents (52%) favor negotiating. Republicans favor it at 43%, with 49% strongly opposed. Respondents aged 60 to 75 are the most resistant: 39% favor and 47% strongly oppose.

Figure 18




Q18. International mediation of an agreement between the United States and Cuba

A slim majority disapproves of a mediated agreement through Caribbean governments or the Vatican.

Fifty-two percent disapprove of international mediation, and 44% disapprove strongly; 48% approve. Democrats approve at 77%, those born outside Cuba at 65%, and respondents under 40 and Independents at 57%. Republicans reject mediation: 32% approve and 60% strongly disapprove. Among the pre-1995 and 1995 to 2020 migrants, approval sits at 42% to 43%.

Figure 19




Q19. Easing sanctions in exchange for a free market economy within two years

Two thirds approve of trading sanctions relief for a free market transformation.

Sixty-seven percent approve of an agreement in which the United States eases sanctions while Cuba moves to a free market system within two years. Twenty-nine percent disapprove, and 4% volunteered that they would not approve without political reforms. Approval reaches 89% among Democrats, 78% among Independents, 77% among those born outside Cuba, and 76% among respondents under 40. Republicans approve at 57%, with 32% strongly disapproving. The 76 and older cohort (58%) and the pre-1995 migrants (61%) also approve by smaller margins.

Figure 20




Q20. Allowing the current government to remain in power in exchange for free market reforms

Eight in ten reject any deal that leaves Cuba's current government in power for economic reforms alone.

Eighty percent disapprove, and 71% disapprove strongly; 18% approve. The same economic reforms that win 67% approval in Q19 win 18% once the current government stays in place. Republicans (80%) and the pre-1995 migrants (79%) strongly disapprove in the largest numbers. Democrats approve at the highest rate (38%), followed by those born outside Cuba (29%), but 44% of Democrats still strongly disapprove.

Figure 21




Q21. Allowing the current government to remain in power with a plan for multiparty elections within two years

Fifty-four percent disapprove of a transition deal that keeps the current government in power until multiparty elections.

Forty-six percent approve, and 48% strongly disapprove. Men approve at a higher rate (52%) than women (39%). Democrats (63%), those born outside Cuba (60%), Independents (52%), and respondents under 40 (52%) approve. Republicans (38%), the pre-1995 migrants (38%), and non-citizens (39%) give the plan the least support.


Figure 22



Q22. A multiparty system with free elections in which the Communist Party may compete
Cuban Americans split on letting the Communist Party compete in free elections.

Fifty-one percent approve of a multiparty agreement that allows the Communist Party to run, and 49% oppose it; 43% strongly oppose. Democrats (71%), respondents under 40 (60%), non-citizens (61%), and the post-2020 arrivals (82%) approve. Republicans approve at 39%, and 56% of them strongly oppose. The pre-1995 migrants (43%) and the 60 to 75 cohort (45%) also fall below half.

Figure 23




Military Action, Threat, and Terrorism

Q23. U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government

Seventy-three percent support U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government.

Sixty percent support it strongly. Support reaches 87% among Republicans, 84% among the post-2020 arrivals, and 79% among both the 40 to 59 cohort and those who arrived between 1995 and 2020. Sixty-eight percent of Independents and 69% of respondents under 40 agree. Respondents 76 and older support military action at 64%, and 31% of them strongly oppose it. Those born outside Cuba divide (54% support, 46% oppose). Democrats oppose: 38% support and 50% strongly oppose.

Figure 24




Q24. What type of military action would you be more likely to support?

Clandestine operations are the preferred form of military action.

Forty-three percent choose a clandestine operation by the CIA or another secret activity. Twenty-eight percent prefer bombing selected military targets, 15% choose all of the above, and 14% a land invasion. Fewer than 1% support bombing urban areas. Women prefer clandestine operations (50%) more than men (36%), and men lean more toward bombing military targets (32% to 24%).

Clandestine operations draw 53% of respondents under 40, 68% of non-citizens, and 70% of the post-2020 arrivals. Eight percent of the full sample did not choose.


Figure 25



Q25. Cuba is the primary driving force behind the spread of left-wing ideas in the United States
Sixty-three percent agree that Cuba drives the spread of left-wing ideas in the United States.

Forty-seven percent agree strongly. Agreement runs highest among Republicans (78%), the 60 to 75 cohort (77%), non-citizens (76%), and the 1995 to 2020 arrivals (74%). Fifty-five percent of Independents agree. Respondents under 40 split (45% agree). Those born outside Cuba (28%) and Democrats (22%) reject the statement; 51% and 62% of them, respectively, strongly disagree.

Figure 26




Q26. Cuba poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States

Fifty-nine percent see Cuba as a threat to vital U.S. interests.

Forty-six percent agree strongly. Men agree at a higher rate (65%) than women (53%). Republicans (77%), the 60 to 75 cohort (71%), and the pre-1995 migrants (68%) see the threat most. Agreement falls to 46% among respondents under 40, 42% among the post-2020 arrivals, 37% among those born outside Cuba, and 21% among Democrats.

Figure 27




Q27. Cuba's inclusion on the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism

More than two thirds approve of keeping Cuba on the terrorism list.

Sixty-nine percent approve of Cuba's inclusion, and 55% approve strongly. Approval reaches 86% among Republicans, 83% in the 60 to 75 cohort, and 82% among the pre-1995 migrants. Independents (66%) and non-citizens (65%) also approve. Support thins among respondents under 40 (53%) and those born outside Cuba (49%). Democrats disapprove: 29% approve and 51% strongly disapprove.

Figure 28




Ties to the Island

Q34. Close relatives or significant others living in Cuba

Seventy-one percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida have close relatives in Cuba.

The share climbs with each wave of migration: 63% of those who left before 1995, 82% of the 1995 to 2020 arrivals, and 92% of those who came after 2020. Eighty-seven percent of non-citizens have family on the island. Just over half of those born outside Cuba (52%) and of respondents 76 and older (53%) report close relatives there.

Figure 29




Q35. Sending food and other items to friends and relatives on the island during the past year

Sixty percent sent food or other goods to Cuba in the past year.

The most recent arrivals send the most: 87% of the post-2020 migrants and 76% of non-citizens. Seventy-two percent of the 1995 to 2020 arrivals and 65% of the 40 to 59 cohort sent goods. Fewer than half of the pre-1995 migrants (49%), respondents 76 and older (47%), and those born outside Cuba (42%) did so.

Figure 30




Q36. Sending money back to Cuba

Forty-five percent of Cuban American families send remittances to the island.

Men report sending money at a higher rate (49%) than women (41%). The youngest respondents lead: 57% of those under 40 send remittances. Seventy percent of the post-2020 arrivals and 51% of the 1995 to 2020 arrivals send money, compared with 37% of the pre-1995 migrants. Respondents 76 and older (36%) and those born outside Cuba (36%) send the least. Democrats (51%) send at a higher rate than Republicans (41%).

Figure 31




Q37. Returning to live in Cuba if the economy improved

Seventy percent say they are not at all likely to return to Cuba even if its economy improved.

Only 16% say a return would be very or somewhat likely, and 6% very likely. Men (20%) are more open to returning than women (12%). Interest rises among non-citizens (25%), the post-2020 arrivals (25%), and respondents under 40 (21%). Among those 76 and older, 79% say they are not at all likely to go back.

Figure 32




Q38. Returning to live in Cuba if the island changed politically

Political change raises interest in returning, but 63% would still not go back.

Twenty-two percent say they would be very or somewhat likely to return to live in Cuba if it changed politically, compared with 16% under an improved economy. Eight percent say very likely. The post-2020 arrivals (39%) and non-citizens (36%) express the most interest, followed by respondents under 40 (25%). The pre-1995 migrants (18%) and respondents 76 and older (17%) express the least.

Figure 33




Citizenship, Party, and the Elections

Q40. U.S. citizenship

Eighty-nine percent of respondents are U.S. citizens.

Citizenship reaches 99% among those born outside Cuba, 96% among respondents 76 and older, and 94% among those who left Cuba before 1995. The 40 to 59 cohort has the lowest rate among age groups (85%). Fewer than one in ten of the post-2020 arrivals (8%) are citizens.

Figure 34




Q41. Voter registration

Ninety-six percent of citizens report being registered to vote.

Another 2% say they will register, and 3% say they will not. Registration is nearly universal among the pre-1995 migrants (99%), the 40 to 59 cohort (98%), and respondents 76 and older (98%). It dips to 93% among respondents under 40 and those aged 60 to 75, and to 94% among the 1995 to 2020 arrivals.

Figure 35




Q42. Party registration

The Republican Party claims 53% of registered Cuban American voters.

Twenty-seven percent are registered as Independents, 18% as Democrats, and 1% with another party. Republicans dominate among respondents 76 and older (65%) and the pre-1995 migrants (65%), and hold a majority (54%) of the 1995 to 2020 arrivals. Respondents under 40 divide three ways: 40% Republican, 34% Independent, and 24% Democrat. Those born outside Cuba split almost evenly (36% Republican, 32% Independent, 30% Democrat). Men register as Independents at a higher rate (30%) than women (25%).

Figure 36




Q43. The race for U.S. Senator

Ashley Moody leads Angela Nixon two to one, but 44% of voters remain undecided.

With undecided voters included, Moody draws 28%, Nixon 14%, Neil Gillespie 1%, and other candidates 8%; 5% will not vote and 44% do not know. Among voters who named a choice, Moody leads with 51% to Nixon's 26%, with 13% choosing another candidate and 9% saying they will not vote. Moody's strength lies with the pre-1995 migrants (65%) and the 60 to 75 cohort (62%). Respondents under 40 split (Nixon 37%, Moody 36%), and those born outside Cuba favor Nixon (46% to 29%). Independents divide evenly (31% each), with 22% choosing another candidate. Three in four Republicans (76%) back Moody, and 82% of Democrats back Nixon.

Figure 37




Q44. The race for Governor of Florida

Byron Donalds leads David Jolly, with 39% of voters undecided.

With undecided voters included, Donalds draws 37%, Jolly 15%, Dean Abraham 2%, Scott Jewett 1%, and other candidates 7%; 39% do not know. Among voters who named a choice, Donalds leads 60% to 24%, with 12% choosing another candidate. Donalds wins 78% of the pre-1995 migrants and two thirds of respondents over 60. Respondents under 40 favor Donalds by a narrower margin (43% to 35%), with 18% choosing another candidate. Those born outside Cuba prefer Jolly (47% to 40%). Independents lean to Donalds (38% to 33%), and a quarter of them (25%) pick another candidate. Republicans (87%) and Democrats (89%) line up behind their nominees.

Figure 38




Q47. Voting for Congressional Representative

Sixty-eight percent would vote for the Republican running in their congressional district.

Twenty-eight percent would vote for the Democrat and 4% for neither; 12% of the full sample did not know. The Republican advantage is largest among the pre-1995 migrants (78%) and respondents over 60 (74% to 75%). Respondents under 40 favor the Republican by 55% to 39%. Independents lean Republican (51% to 40%). Those born outside Cuba split (48% Democrat, 45% Republican).

Figure 39




Q48. Democratic nominee for President in 2028

A majority (54%) would support no Democrat for President in 2028.

Among respondents who answered, Gavin Newsom (9%), Kamala Harris (9%), and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (8%) lead the Democratic field, followed by Pete Buttigieg (3%) and Jon Ossoff (2%); 9% name another candidate and 5% would accept any Democrat. Nineteen percent of the full sample did not choose. Democrats favor Ocasio-Cortez (24%), Harris (20%), and Newsom (17%), and 17% would support any Democrat. Ocasio-Cortez also leads among respondents under 40 (19%) and those born outside Cuba (21%). Seventy-eight percent of Republicans and 36% of Independents would support no Democrat; Independents give Newsom 15%.

Figure 40




Q49. Republican nominee for President in 2028

Marco Rubio is the overwhelming Republican choice for 2028, at 58%.

J.D. Vance follows at 8%, Ron DeSantis at 7%, and Tucker Carlson at 3%; 5% would support any Republican and 16% none. Eleven percent of the full sample did not choose. Rubio wins 65% of Republicans, 55% of Independents, and 26% of Democrats. Women prefer him at a higher rate (62%) than men (53%). He reaches 68% among the 1995 to 2020 arrivals and 72% among non-citizens. Vance's best showing comes in the 60 to 75 cohort (14%). Those born outside Cuba give Rubio 36%, and 35% of them would support no Republican.

Figure 41




Iran and the Administration's Handling of Key Issues

Q50. U.S. military action against Iran

Fifty-seven percent approve of U.S. military action against Iran.

Thirty-nine percent approve strongly, and 9% of the full sample offered no opinion. Men approve at a higher rate (60%) than women (54%). Republicans (79%), the pre-1995 migrants (67%), and respondents over 40 (60% to 65%) give the strongest approval. Independents divide (46%). Majorities of respondents under 40 (59%) and of those born outside Cuba (65%) disapprove. Democrats reject the action: 14% approve and 73% strongly disapprove.

Figure 42




Q58. The administration's handling of Cuba policy

Two thirds of Cuban Americans support the administration's handling of Cuba policy.

Sixty-six percent support it, and 37% support it strongly. Republicans (81%), the post-2020 arrivals (78%), non-citizens (74%), and the pre-1995 migrants (73%) give the strongest support, and 71% of the 1995 to 2020 arrivals agree. Independents (62%) and respondents under 40 (56%) also support it, by smaller margins. Those born outside Cuba split (46% support). Democrats oppose: 22% support and 57% strongly oppose.

Figure 43




Q59. The administration's handling of China policy

Sixty-eight percent support the administration's handling of China.

Thirteen percent of the full sample offered no opinion. Support reaches 86% among Republicans, 76% among the pre-1995 migrants, and 75% in the 60 to 75 cohort. Independents (59%) and respondents under 40 (57%) support it by smaller margins. Those born outside Cuba split evenly (50%), and 31% of Democrats approve.

Figure 44




Q60. The administration's handling of Russia policy

Sixty-four percent support the administration's handling of Russia.

Thirteen percent of the full sample offered no opinion. Republicans (80%), non-citizens (74%), the 60 to 75 cohort (72%), and the 1995 to 2020 arrivals (70%) give the strongest support. Independents and respondents under 40 support it at 54%. Those born outside Cuba (44%) and Democrats (27%) give it the least.

Figure 45




Q61. The administration's handling of the economy

Cuban Americans split evenly on the administration's handling of the economy.

Fifty percent support and 50% oppose it; "strongly oppose" is the most common single answer (35%). Support for the administration's economic record runs 16 points below support for its Cuba policy (66%). Republicans support it at 69%. Respondents 76 and older and the pre-1995 migrants back it at 59%. Majorities of Independents (59%), non-citizens (54%), and the post-2020 arrivals (59%) oppose it. Two thirds of respondents under 40 (66%) and of those born outside Cuba (68%) oppose it, as do 92% of Democrats, 76% of them strongly.

Figure 46




Q62. The administration's handling of relations with Israel

Sixty percent support the administration's handling of relations with Israel.

Nine percent of the full sample offered no opinion. Support reaches 79% among Republicans, 73% in the 60 to 75 cohort, 72% among non-citizens, and 71% among the pre-1995 migrants. Independents split evenly (50%). Respondents under 40 oppose (62%), with 42% strongly opposed, as do those born outside Cuba (68%) and Democrats (85%).

Figure 47



The Importance of Selected Issues to Cuban Americans in South Florida


Respondents rated seven issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 means greatest importance. Six of the seven average above 3.9 in the full sample. The economy (4.78) and health care (4.73) lead, immigration follows at 4.35, and Cuba policy comes fourth at 4.18. China (4.01) and Russia (3.96) fall just behind. DEI ranks last at 3.30 and shows the widest spread of any issue across the subgroups, from 2.85 among Republicans to 4.17 among the post-2020 arrivals. The figures that follow break the ratings out by gender, age, migration period, and party.

Importance of Selected Issues by Gender

Women rate every issue except China at least as high as men do, and the gap is widest on DEI.

Both genders put the economy and health care first. Women rate the two identically (4.81), while men place the economy (4.74) ahead of health care (4.63). Women give higher marks to immigration (4.47 against 4.23) and Cuba policy (4.30 against 4.05). Ratings of China (4.03 for men, 4.00 for women) and Russia (3.95 and 3.97) differ by less than 0.1. DEI shows the largest gender gap, 3.62 among women and 2.97 among men, and it ranks last for both.

Figure 48




Importance of Selected Issues by Age

The economy leads among respondents under 60, health care leads among those 60 and older, and concern about Cuba policy climbs with age.

Health care tops the list for respondents 76 and older (4.78) and those 60 to 75 (4.78), with the economy close behind in the 60 to 75 cohort (4.76). The economy ranks first among those 40 to 59 (4.84) and 18 to 39 (4.77). Cuba policy rises at every step up the age scale: 3.89 among the youngest, 4.17 in the 40 to 59 cohort, 4.45 at 60 to 75, and 4.47 among the oldest, who rank it third, ahead of immigration (4.36). The youngest respondents give China (3.67) and Russia (3.66) the lowest ratings of any age group. DEI ranks last in every age group, though the oldest rate it highest (3.88) and the 40 to 59 cohort lowest (3.10).

Figure 49




Importance of Selected Issues by Migration Period

The economy and health care lead for every migration cohort, and the post-2020 arrivals give DEI far more weight than earlier cohorts do.

Health care ranks first among those who migrated before 1995 (4.72) and among the post-2020 arrivals (4.85). The economy ranks first among 1995 to 2020 migrants (4.84) and among Cuban Americans born outside Cuba (4.77). Immigration holds third place in every group. Cuba policy ranks fourth in the three Cuba-born cohorts and earns its highest rating from the newest arrivals (4.53). Among those born outside Cuba it ranks fifth (3.74), just behind China (3.78). The post-2020 arrivals rate DEI at 4.17, which places it fifth, ahead of Russia (3.97) and China (3.83). Every other cohort places DEI last, at ratings from 3.22 to 3.33. The post-2020 group makes up about 5% of the sample, so its figures carry wide margins.

Figure 50




Importance of Selected Issues by Party Affiliation

Party groups agree on the top two issues and split on Cuba policy, China, Russia, and DEI.

The economy ranks first among Republicans (4.77) and Independents (4.74). Democrats tie health care and the economy at 4.85, and non-citizens tie them at 4.88. Immigration takes third place for Republicans (4.46), Independents (4.21), and Democrats (4.34). Among non-citizens, Cuba policy ranks third at 4.66, ahead of immigration (4.49). Cuba policy draws its lowest rating from Democrats (3.81) and its second highest from Republicans (4.30). Republicans give China (4.23) and Russia (4.12) higher ratings than any other group. DEI divides the groups most sharply. Republicans rate it 2.85 and Independents 3.32, last on both lists. Democrats rate it 4.09, which places it fourth, ahead of Cuba policy, China (3.63), and Russia (3.55). Non-citizens rate it 3.96, level with Russia (3.99) and China (3.95).

Figure 51



APPENDIX 1: NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

The 2026 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone survey of Cuban American residents in South Florida. The target population encompasses all self-identified Cuban adults (aged 18 or older) currently residing in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)–compliant landline and cellular numbers operating within the area.

The survey used a probability sample of 1,004 Cuban American adults. For a yes or no question (dichotomous variables) answered by all respondents, the maximum margin of error is plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level, after accounting for weighting. Results for subgroups, such as recent arrivals, carry larger chance errors.

A probability sample was constructed using a Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure. FIU contracted NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the field interviews. Respondents who self-identified as Cuban were administered a bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire via a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system.

Data collection took place from September 4 to September 29, 2026, during which a total of 178,936 phone calls were placed. Among the individuals reached, 46,847 declined to participate, and 4,879 were determined to be of non-Cuban origin. The survey team successfully contacted 1,070 eligible respondents who consented to participate; however, 66 respondents did not complete the interview in full. Consequently, the final sample comprises 1,004 complete, eligible respondents. A majority of the sample (78.9%) completed the interview via cell phone, and 62.9% of all interviews were conducted in Spanish.

All results presented in this report are weighted to reflect the target population accurately. A four-way weighting system was constructed using gender, age, country of birth, and year of migration (for those born in Cuba). Population benchmarks were derived from the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2020–2024 5-year sample.

All figures in this report are graphed using exact values; however, most reported percentages are rounded to whole numbers for visual clarity. As a result of rounding error, distributional percentages may not always sum to exactly 100%.

Table 2 presents the estimated number of Cuban American registered voters categorized by political party, based on two key assumptions:


1. The voter registration rate is assumed to be uniform across all Hispanic communities (69.4% for Florida overall and 74.7% for MDC).
2. The state-level party distribution among Cuban American registered voters is assumed to mirror the distribution observed in Miami-Dade County.

Figure 2 is likewise constructed using these assumptions.

APPENDIX 2: SELECTED TRENDS


Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2026)

Figure 52



Party Affiliation Over time (2007-2026)

Figure 53



APPENDIX 3: SELECTED QUESTIONS

Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these policies.

1. First, allow companies to sell medicine in an unrestricted way to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this? *[Esta es una pregunta sobre Cuba actualmente.] Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?*
2. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba in an unrestricted way. [Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?] *Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?*
3. Allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba. Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose? *Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?*
4. On the issue of the sixty-four year old trade embargo, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? *¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo de 64 años contra Cuba? ¿Está decididamente a favor, parcialmente a favor, parcialmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?*
5. On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba? *¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?*
6. Some people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change. Other people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that directly help the Cuban people improve their economic well-being. Thinking now about the policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban Government, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach? *Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno de los EE. UU. debe enfatizar las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano para promover el cambio de régimen. Otras personas dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos debe enfatizar las políticas que ayudan directamente al pueblo cubano a mejorar su bienestar económico. Now thinking now about emphasizing policies that are directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach? Pensando ahora en las políticas que se dirigen específicamente a mejorar el bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o muy en contra con este enfoque político?*
7. Thinking now about emphasizing policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban Government, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach? *Pensando ahora en las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o muy en contra con este enfoque político?*

8. Now thinking about Cuba today: the United States has imposed a "maximum pressure" campaign on Cuba, cutting the island off from fuel imports and sanctioning countries that attempt to provide fuel to Cuba. Do you favor or oppose the current blockage of oil imports to Cuba? *Estados Unidos ha impuesto una campaña de "máxima presión" sobre Cuba, cortando la entrada de combustible a la isla y sancionando a los países que intentan suministrarle combustible. ¿Está usted a favor o en contra del bloqueo actual de las importaciones de petróleo a Cuba?*
9. Cuba is experiencing a severe shortage of energy products used in the household, such as propane and gas. Do you favor or oppose allowing Cuba's private sector to play a greater role in increasing the supply of this kind of fuel directly to Cuban households? Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose? *Cuba está atravesando una escasez severa del combustible ligero que las familias usan en el hogar para cocinar, como el gas propano. ¿Está usted a favor o en contra de permitir que el sector privado de Cuba tenga un papel más amplio en suministrar este tipo de combustible directamente a los hogares cubanos? ¿Estarías totalmente a favor, parcialmente a favor, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra.*
10. Overall, do you favor or oppose the United States providing more assistance to Cuba's private sector, rather than the Cuban government, as a way to relieve the humanitarian crisis on the island? Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose? *En general, ¿está a favor o en contra de que Estados Unidos brinde más asistencia al sector privado de Cuba, en lugar de al gobierno cubano, como una forma de aliviar la crisis humanitaria en la isla? ¿Estarías totalmente a favor, parcialmente a favor, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra.*
11. Do you approve or disapprove of the current administration's increased deportations of Cuban nationals from the United States who do not currently have legal status but have no criminal record? Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose? *¿Aprueba usted o desaprueba las crecientes deportaciones, por parte del gobierno de Trump, de ciudadanos cubanos que actualmente no tienen. todavía estatus legal en Estados Unidos pero que no tienen antecedentes penales?*
12. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the U.S. government should resume the processing of immigration benefits for Cubans already residing in the United States? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? *¿Cree usted que el gobierno debería reanudar el procesamiento de beneficios de inmigración para los cubanos que ya residen en Estados Unidos? ¿Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra, o totalmente en contra?*
13. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: The U.S. government's "maximum pressure" policy will succeed in causing a regime change in Cuba? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? *¿Cree usted que la política de "máxima presión" de Trump logrará causar un cambio de régimen en Cuba? ¿Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra, o totalmente en contra?*
14. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: The increased suffering of the Cuban people imposed by U.S. policies is an acceptable cost to achieve regime change in Cuba? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? *¿Cree usted que el aumento del sufrimiento del pueblo cubano es un precio justo a pagar para lograr un cambio de régimen? ¿Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra, o totalmente en contra?*
15. Do you favor or oppose the administration's negotiating directly with influential members of Cuba's current leadership? Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose? *¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que el gobierno de Trump negocie directamente con miembros influyentes del liderazgo actual de Cuba?*

16. Some have proposed that international mediators, such as Caribbean governments or the Vatican, help negotiate an agreement between the United States and Cuba, instead of the two governments negotiating directly. Would you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of this kind of *mediated negotiation*? *Algunos han propuesto que mediadores internacionales, como gobiernos del Caribe o el Vaticano, ayuden a negociar un acuerdo entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, en lugar de que los dos gobiernos negocien directamente. ¿Estarías totalmente a favor, parcialmente a favor, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra con este tipo de negociación mediada?*
17. Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement in which the United States eases its sanctions on Cuba in exchange for Cuba transforming its economy to a free market system within two years. within two years? Would you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of this kind of *agreement*? *¿Estaría usted a favor o en contra de un acuerdo en el cual Estados Unidos reduzca sus sanciones a Cuba a cambio de reformas profundas en el sistema económico en la isla, incluso si ese acuerdo no conduce a un sistema político multipartidista? ¿Estarías totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra de un tal acuerdo?*
18. Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement that allows Cuba's current government to remain in power if it makes significant free market economic reforms within the next two years? Would you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of this kind of *agreement*? *¿Estaría de favor o en contra con un acuerdo que permita que el actual gobierno de Cuba permanezca en el poder si realiza reformas económicas significativas en un plazo de dos años? ¿Estarías totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra de un tal acuerdo?*
19. Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement that allows Cuba's current government to remain in power if there is a clear plan of transition to a multiparty system and scheduled multiparty free elections within two years? Would you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of this kind of such an *agreement*? *¿Estaría a favor o en contra de un acuerdo que permita que el actual gobierno de Cuba permanezca en el poder si existiera un plan claro de transición hacia un sistema multipartidista y una fecha para celebrar elecciones en un plazo de dos años? ¿Estarías totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra?*
20. Would you approve or oppose of an agreement that leads to a multiparty political system in Cuba, with free elections, in which the Communist Party is allowed to compete as one of the parties? Do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose? *¿Aprobaría usted o desaprobaría un acuerdo que conduzca a un sistema político multipartidista en Cuba, con elecciones libres, en el cual se permita al Partido Comunista competir como uno de los partidos? ¿Estarías totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra?*
21. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government? *¿está decididamente a favor, parcialmente a favor, parcialmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra a una acción militar de Estados Unidos para derrocar al gobierno cubano?*
22. What type of military action would you be more likely to support: a land invasion, a bombing of urban areas, bombing of selected military targets, or some sort of clandestine operation by the CIA or other secret activity? *¿Qué tipo de acción militar apoyaría usted con mayor probabilidad: una invasión terrestre, un bombardeo de zonas urbanas, un bombardeo de objetivos militares seleccionados, o algún tipo de operación encubierta de la CIA u otra actividad secreta?*

23. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement: Cuba is the primary driving force behind the spread of left-wing ideas in the United States? *¿Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o totalmente en contra con que Cuba es la fuerza principal detrás de la difusión de ideas de izquierda en Estados Unidos?*
24. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that Cuba poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States? *¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, parcialmente de acuerdo, parcialmente en contra o muy en contra con que Cuba representa una amenaza para los intereses vitales de los Estados Unidos?*
25. The United State Department of State includes Cuba on a list four countries considered to be State Sponsors of Terrorism. Cuba along with Iran, Sudan and Syria are on the list. Do you believe that Cuba should be on that list? *El Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos incluye a Cuba en una lista de cuatro países considerados como patrocinadores del terrorismo. Cuba junto con Irán, Sudán y Siria están en la lista. ¿Cree que Cuba debería estar en esa lista.*
26. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba, newspapers, television, radio, or some other source? *¿Dónde obtiene usted la mayor parte de las noticias sobre Cuba (incluyendo de manera digital vía computadoras, tabletas o teléfonos), en los periódicos, la televisión, la radio, o en alguna otra fuente?*
27. Which digital platform do you rely on most frequently for real-time news regarding events in Cuba? *¿En qué plataforma digital confía usted con mayor frecuencia para obtener noticias en tiempo real sobre lo que ocurre en Cuba?*
28. How often have you traveled to Cuba? Would you say often, sometimes, hardly, or never? *¿Con qué frecuencia ha viajado a Cuba? ¿Diría que a menudo, a veces, casi nunca o nunca?*
29. Have you or your family sent food and other items to friends and relatives on the island during the past year? *Ahora pensando en cómo usted y su familia se mantienen en contacto con amigos o familiares en Cuba: ¿ha enviado usted o su familia comida u otros artículos a amigos o familiares en la isla durante el último año?*
30. Do you or your family send money back to Cuba? *¿Me podría decir si usted o algún miembro de su familia envía dinero a Cuba?*
31. How likely is it that you would return to live in Cuba if the economy improved? Would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely? *Si la economía cubana mejorara, ¿cuál sería la posibilidad de que usted regresara a Cuba a vivir? ¿Usted diría que muy probablemente, más o menos probable, no muy probable, o no habría ninguna probabilidad?*
32. If Cuba changed politically, how likely is it that you would return to Cuba to live? Would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely? *Si Cuba cambiase políticamente, ¿cuál sería la posibilidad de que usted regresara a Cuba a vivir? ¿Usted diría que muy probablemente, más o menos probable, no muy probable, o no habría ninguna probabilidad?*
33. Politically, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? *¿Políticamente se considera más cercano/a al Partido Republicano o Demócrata?*